Present Wars affecting the United States

1. [ 1st war] Republicans vs Democrats

This is a very crucial and dangerous war for several reasons;

A. It affects all Americans
B. The outcome will determine what decisions are made for our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.
C. What decisions are made concerning our economy.
D. What decisions are made regarding the evil threats of terrorism.
E. This war has broken down traditional parties ... to a point where no parties can agree on anything, very dangerous considering these parties make up our present form of government.
F. Decisions that may affect the soveirenty of America altogether.
G. During this Presidential campaign .. the present candidates for Presidency are questionable.

[2nd War] Terrorism abroad .. worldwide

[3rd War] Terrorism and the evil within our own country by foreigners and Americans who seek to destroy our country's religion and practices, American traditions, morals, family structures, education system, freedoms and rights of good Americans here by whatever means.

As Americans, we are living during dangerous times . Our world and country today is vulnerable to attacks from within and abroad ... until our leaders begin to make good decisions, our parties join together instead of fighting each other ... we might be able to produce some actions to prevent future devastation for all.

Potential Biological Weapons Threats

Mark G. Kortepeter and Gerald W. Parker
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland, USA

The list of agents that could pose the greatest public health risk in the event of a bioterrorist attack is short. However, although short, the list includes agents that, if acquired and properly disseminated, could cause a difficult public health challenge in terms of our ability to limit the numbers of casualties and control the damage to our cities and nation.

The use of biological weapons has occurred sporadically for centuries, culminating in sophisticated research and testing programs run by several countries. Biological weapons proliferation is a serious problem that is increasing the probability of a serious bioterrorism incident. The accidental release of anthrax from a military testing facility in the former Soviet Union in 1979 and Iraq's admission in 1995 to having quantities of anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin ready to use as weapons have clearly shown that research in the offensive use of biological agents continued, despite the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (1,2). Of the seven countries listed by the U.S. Department of State as sponsoring international terrorism (3), at least five are suspected to have biological warfare programs. There is no evidence at this time, however, that any state has provided biological weapons expertise to a terrorist organization (4).

A wide range of groups or individuals might use biological agents as instruments of terror. At the most dangerous end of the spectrum are large organizations that are well-funded and possibly state-supported. They would be expected to cause the greatest harm, because of their access to scientific expertise, biological agents, and most importantly, dissemination technology, including the capability to produce refined dry agent, deliverable in milled particles of the proper size for aerosol dissemination. The Aum Shinrikyo in Japan is an example of a well-financed organization that was attempting to develop biological weapons capability. However, they were not successful in their multiple attempts to release anthrax and botulinum toxin (4). On this end of the spectrum, the list of biological agents available to cause mass casualties is small and would probably include one of the classic biological agents. The probability of occurrence is low; however, the consequences of a possible successful attack are serious.

Smaller, less sophisticated organizations may or may not have the intent to kill but may use biological pathogens to further their specific goals. The Rajhneeshees, who attempted to influence local elections in The Dalles, Oregon, by contaminating salad bars with Salmonella Typhimurium, are an example (5). Rather than having a sophisticated research program, these organizations could use biological pathogens that are readily available.

The third type are smaller groups or individuals who may have very limited targets (e.g., individuals or buildings) and are using biological pathogens in murder plots or to threaten havoc. The recent anthrax hoaxes are examples of this. Many biological agents could be used in such instances and the likelihood of their occurrence is high, but the public health consequences are low.

There are many potential human biological pathogens. A North Atlantic Treaty Organization handbook dealing with biological warfare defense lists 39 agents, including bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, and toxins, that could be used as biological weapons (6). Examining the relationship between aerosol infectivity and toxicity versus quantity of agent illustrates the requirements for producing equivalent effects and narrows the spectrum of possible agents that could be used to cause large numbers of casualities. For example, the amount of agent needed to cover a 100-km² area and cause 50% lethality is 8 metric tons for even a "highly toxic" toxin such as ricin versus only kilogram quantities of anthrax needed to achieve the same coverage. Thus, deploying an agent such as ricin over a wide area, although possible, becomes impractical from a logistics standpoint, even for a well-funded organization (7). The potential impact on a city can be estimated by looking at the effectiveness of an aerosol in producing downwind casualties. The World Health Organization in 1970 modeled the results of a hypothetical dissemination of 50 kg of agent along a 2-km line upwind of a large population center. Anthrax and tularemia are predicted to cause the highest number of dead and incapacitated, as well as the greatest downwind spread (8).

For further indication of which pathogens make effective biological weapons, one could look at the agents studied by the United States when it had an offensive biological weapons research program. Under that program, which was discontinued in 1969, the United States produced the following to fill munitions: Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, Francisella tularensis, Brucella suis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, and Coxiella burnetti (9). As a further indication of which pathogens have the requisite physical characteristics to make good biological weapons, one need only look next at the agents that former Soviet Union biological weapons experts considered likely candidates. The agents included smallpox, plague, anthrax, botulinum toxin, equine encephalitis viruses, tularemia, Q fever, Marburg, melioidosis, and typhus (10,11). Criteria such as infectivity and toxicity, environmental stability, ease of large-scale production, and disease severity were used in determining which agents had a high probability of use. Both the United States before 1969 and the former Soviet Union spent years determining which pathogens had strategic and tactical capability.

The National Defense University recently compiled a study of more than 100 confirmed incidents of illicit use of biological agents during this century (W.S. Carus, pers. comm. [4]). Of the 100 incidents, 29 involved agent acquisition, and of the 29, 19 involved the actual nongovernmental use of an agent, and most were used for biocrimes, rather than for bioterrorism. In the context of this study, the distinguishing feature of bioterrorism is that it involves the use of "violence on behalf of a political, religious, ecologic, or other ideologic cause without reference to the moral or political justice of the cause." The balance of incidents involved an expressed interest, threat of use, or an attempt to acquire an agent. In the 1990s, incidents increased markedly, but most have been hoaxes. The pathogens involved present a wide spectrum, from those with little ability to cause disease or disability, such as Ascaris suum, to some of the familiar agents deemed most deadly, such as B. anthracis, ricin, plague, and botulinum toxins (Table). During this period, the number of known deaths is only 10, while the total number of casualties is 990. However, the numbers should not give a false sense of security that mass lethality is not achievable by a determined terrorist group. The sharp increase in biological threats, hoaxes, information, and Internet sources on this subject seen in recent years indicates a growing interest in the possible use of biological pathogens for nefarious means (4).

In general, the existing public health systems should be able to handle most attempts to release biological pathogens. A working group organized by the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies recently looked at potential biological agents to decide which present the greatest risk for a maximum credible event from a public health perspective. A maximum credible event would be one that could cause large loss of life, in addition to disruption, panic, and overwhelming of the civilian health-care resources (12).

To be used for a maximum credible event, an agent must have some of the following properties: the agent should be highly lethal and easily produced in large quantities. Given that the aerosol route is the most likely for a large-scale attack, stability in aerosol and capability to be dispersed (17µm to 5 µm particle size) are necessary. Additional attributes that make an agent even more dangerous include being communicable from person to person and having no treatment or vaccine.

When the potential agents are reviewed for these characteristics, anthrax and smallpox are the two with greatest potential for mass casualties and civil disruption. 1) Both are highly lethal: the death rate for anthrax if untreated before onset of serious symptoms exceeds 80%; 30% of unvaccinated patients infected with variola major could die. 2) Both are stable for transmission in aerosol and capable of large-scale production. Anthrax spores have been known to survive for decades under the right conditions (13). WHO was concerned that smallpox might be freeze-dried to retain virulence for prolonged periods (8). 3) Both have been developed as agents in state programs. Iraq has produced anthrax for use in Scud missiles and conducted research on camelpox virus, which is closely related to smallpox (2). A Soviet defector has reported that the former Soviet Union produced smallpox virus by the ton (11). 4) Use of either agent would have a devastating psychological effect on the target population, potentially causing widespread panic. This is in part due to the agents' well-demonstrated historical potential to cause large disease outbreaks (14). 5) Initial recognition of both diseases is likely to be delayed. For anthrax, this is secondary to the rare occurrence of inhalation anthrax. Only 11 cases of inhalation anthrax have been reported in the United States from 1945 to 1994 (15), and recognition may be delayed until after antibiotic use would be beneficial. For smallpox, given that few U.S. physicians have any clinical experience with the disease, many could confuse it for more common diseases (e.g., varicella and bullous erythema multiforme) early on, allowing for second-generation spread (12,16). 6) Availability of vaccines for either disease is limited. Anthrax vaccine, licensed in 1970, has been used for persons at high risk for contact with this disease. The U.S. military has recently begun vaccinating the entire force; however, there is limited availability of the vaccine for use in the civilian population. Routine smallpox vaccination was discontinued in the United States in 1971. Recent estimates of the current number of doses in storage at CDC range from 5 to 7 million (12), but the viability of stored vaccine is no longer guaranteed.

SOURCE

Overview: Toronto SARS Outbreak

Publication: Medical Laboratory Observer
Publication Date: 01-FEB-07
Delivery: Immediate Online Access
Author: Poutanen, Susan M.

Article Excerpt
Whether it be a lab accident, release of a biologic weapon into the community, the next flu pandemic, or the next SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak, clinical laboratories must be prepared for possible biohazard and bioterror emergencies.

Clinical laboratories in Toronto faced such an emergency during the 2002-2003 SARS outbreak that affected 26 countries and was associated with 8,096 cases and 774 deaths worldwide. In Canada, 251 cases and 43 deaths were reported--the majority of which were hospital-acquired in various Toronto hospitals. Hospital-based labs were mostly affected; and while some had emergency plans, many only had drafts or no plans. All were faced with real-time decision making, adapting daily to the outbreak as it unfolded throughout the city. In the end, the outbreak was controlled and the majority of clinical laboratories have since reviewed their practices and implemented changes based on the many lessons learned from this experience. The impact that the SARS outbreak had on our laboratory and how we responded are presented here with a summary of what we did well and what we could have done better, and recommendations for laboratory biohazard or bioterror emergency planning and preparedness.

Overview: Toronto SARS Outbreak

In Canada, all hospitals and hospital-affiliated laboratories are government-funded. Our laboratory is an academic containment level-2 microbiology service shared between two large academic hospitals. At the time of the SARS outbreak, we had two sites--one housed within an academic hospital and one in an offsite building. We serve a total of nine Ontario hospitals with approximately 5,000 beds and five non-hospital clients. Approximately 40,000 specimens are processed per month.

On March 13, 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) released an e-mail alert regarding a severe respiratory syndrome in Hong Kong and Vietnam. The following day, we became aware of patients with possible SARS in two of our client hospitals including the base hospital in which one of our sites was located. A local press release...

SOURCE

The Human Biohazard

by zane (restricted)

A Definition of Biohazardous Materials:

Biohazardous materials are those materials of biological origin that could potentially cause harm to humans, domestic or wild animals, or plants. Examples include recombinant DNA; transgenic animals or plants, human, animal or plant pathogens; biological toxins (such as tetanus toxin); human blood and certain human body fluids; and human or monkey cell cultures.

Why not also include that tool wielding beast with the large brain and opposable thumbs: Homo sapiens? Consider the following:

The humans have created enough nuclear explosives that, if distributed in an egalitarian fashion, each and every one of them would have the equivalent of 3000 kg of TNT - enough to bring about a nuclear winter and leave the Earth with a pleasant incandescent glow for some undetermined length of time.

Why, shortly, these scrawny hairless bipeds will be completely capable of raining down upon their homeworld another kind of death from above: asteroids purposefully deflected ever so slightly from their distant orbits so as to impact the Earth. This might sound outlandish now... but someday a system to shield the Earth from naturally occuring wanderers will be put in place, and any system capable of preventing that catastrophe is also capable of creating it, in the hands of the wrong overly agressive monkey.

Consider also that there are those among the humans who would unhesitatingly engage in the creation of biological weapons - orgainsms which by design are as biohazardous as possible, and which by the nature of life itself, once created require virtually no infrastructure to manufacture.

Not all of humanity's threats come from agression: perhaps just as dangerous is negligence. H. sapiens is a crisis driven species, persisting in dangerous and destructive behavior until the consequences have become so grave and undeniable as to demand attention. Deforestation and intensive agriculture practices, due in large part to unchecked growth of the human population, have led to mass wasting and loss of productive topsoils in many of the most heavily populated areas, and the destruction of habitat for many other Earth species.

The protective layer of ozone which came into being 2.2 billion years ago, with the advent of oxygenic photosynthesis in cyanobacteria, has slowly been eroded over the last century by emissions from the ever expanding human industry. Their machines. Their factories. Their surrogate thumbs. Other changes in the atmosphere coming at their behest seem to be warming the planet as well. Things are changing, and fast. The fastest biogenic change this world has ever seen.

Homo sapiens is a walking extinction event. They may extinguish themselves, and in the process take much of the painstakingly accumulated complexity of Earth with them. Ironic that such a species should have christened itself with words which mean "wise man".

And if we did extinguish ourselves, how would it look to a long t o a long term observer - someone staring at us unrelentingly over the aeons from the face of the moon perhaps. An eye watching the frozen earth thaw six hundred million years ago, followed by the explosion of Cambrian diversity. They would patiently watch as this newfound complexity multiplied and spread across the globe in new and ever changing patterns, becoming all the ancient creatures of the sea, and creeping out onto the land to begin the age of mighty reptiles, the swarms of insects arriving with the first flowering plants. And every now and then, a cataclysm would change the stage, as did the meteor impact 65 million years ago that ended the Cretaceous, and allowed us our time in the limelight.

Then what would they see, these time-lapsed moon eyes? They would see us climb down from the trees of eastern Africa. They'd see us pick up a rock one day, and heft it in our primitive hands. And they would see those hands change form over the millennia, to heft the rock with more precision, they would see the hand become a tool, the tool. They would witness our entry into the trans-human experience. We are extensible beings; we extend our senses and our bodies with our tools. We are an animal in symbiosis with technology, and our hands were our first tools, the rest are simply extensions of those opposable thumbs - meta tools. Someday we will be unable to live without it. When we disperse throughout the Universe, through the cold, dark, radiation soaked depths of space, it will only be possible because we have extended our senses and bodies. Oxygen, water, food, shelter, and to obtain them, the ever-present glow and hum of our technology.

In contrast, look at the dolphins. They seem to be very intelligent, and capable of complex communication and social behavior. Despite the fact that we do not understand what they say, what they think, I believe that their intellects are at least on par with our own, but they lack the thumb. Their bodies are exquisitely adapted to the environment in which they live, but they cannot willfully adapt to new environments, they have no tools. In some ways, I envy their existence; it seems simpler than ours. But at the same time, it is less free. We are free to the point of potential fault. We are free to destroy ourselves and all that we survey. Is that what we will choose to do?

You can think of life like a differential equation. There are expressions of a certain form which satisfy the equation - these solutions are living organisms. It's much more complex than any differential equation I've ever seen though, as each solution is dependent on which other solutions are currently extant. Dinosaurs were a wonderful solution for millions of years, but they could not have survived in an icy pre-Cambrian world filled only with unicellular life, nor could we. There are some solutions which are doomed. The first oxygenic bacteria apparently poisoned their atmosphere with the byproduct of their own existence: Oxygen, without which virtually none of the life on Earth today would exist. Are we to be one of these solutions? Is an intelligent, tool wielding beast with an evolutionary predisposition to agressive behavior simply non-viable in the long run?

Or will we choose a different path? Today we are on the verge of being able to tinker with the equation of life through genetic engineering. This is the tool to end all tools. Thousands of years ago we moved from gene based evolution to meme based evolution, and now that long litany of ideas has led us back to the genes which gave us the ability to pursue ideas in the first place. Might we, realizing the danger of the evolutionary baggage we carry, decide to drop it?

I don't consider myself pessimistic, I just think we need to realize that we are dangerous, powerful beings, and the choices we make as a society, as a species, have long ranging consequences. The very things that make us so dangerous also give us the potential for transcendence, the power to deeply know the Universe of which we are such a special part.

It is with the desire for this realization in mind that I have created the Human Biohazard Van. Hopefully it will serve as a reminder to a few, and perhaps those few will tell others. If you have seen the van, send me an e-mail and let me know what you thought.

SOURCE

International Information Sharing Needed To Prevent Nuclear Threats

Information about the characteristics of nuclear and other radioactive materials stored and used by countries needs to be shared globally to combat the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and nuclear terrorism, says a report published by the Royal Society.

The report which looks at the issues surrounding the detection of nuclear threats such as the smuggling of nuclear warheads and radioactive materials to make dirty bombs concludes that shared international databases would aid the growing field of nuclear forensics by speeding up and improving the identification of the origins of nuclear materials. It is hoped that this may deter future terrorism attempts.

Professor Roger Cashmore, Chair of the advisory group that produced the report, said: "To reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism we need to increase our ability to detect and respond to the misuse of nuclear materials. This can help the international collection and sharing of information about nuclear materials."

The report which represents the views of over 70 of the world's leading scientific and policy experts from the UK, USA, Russia, Israel and Europe highlights the need for countries that have a nuclear power industry or nuclear weaponry to share technical data for instance on the types of nuclear fuel used by their commercial power stations, or nuclear material used for defence.

"For example, nuclear reactors may use a specific type of fuel, such as uranium pellets. This fuel is then processed to produce nuclear waste products with particular characteristics. Indicators such as these make nuclear materials inherently traceable."

Databases of this type of information are crucial to trace the source of the material after smuggling or, in a worst case scenario, a nuclear incident.

Professor Cashmore continued: "If a bomb made from a certain type of uranium or plutonium was detonated, knowing where that material was processed would enable authorities to trace it back to a specific country's industrial or defence facility. Currently this process could take months but if international information was shared, it could take weeks or even days. Such efficiency would act as a strong deterrent to potential smugglers.

"Information on the type of nuclear materials held by countries is valuable only if it is globally available. At present there is no requirement for countries to collect or share information on their nuclear industry or weaponry."

The report notes that in the UK, as in many countries, there is considerable sensitivity in the commercial and military communities over sharing information on the types and quantities of nuclear material.

"It is of course critical to ensure homeland security is protected. But nuclear and other radioactive materials of concern are spread throughout the world - along with people willing to smuggle them. It is crucial to take account of the potential global threat of trafficking when considering whether it is appropriate to share such sensitive information.

"Consistent international materials databases, used alongside existing surveillance and intelligence, will undoubtedly improve the prevention of nuclear threats and will build international confidence in nuclear security."

SOURCE

Health Problems In Persian Gulf War Veterans Higher Due To Chemical Exposure

A study by researchers at the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine shows there is increasing evidence that high rates of illness in Persian Gulf War Veterans can be explained, in part, by exposure to certain chemicals, including pesticides and nerve agents. Veterans from the 1990-91 conflict have a higher rate of chronic, multi-symptom health problems than either non-deployed personnel or those deployed elsewhere. Symptoms routinely reported by these veterans include fatigue, muscle or joint pain, memory problems, trouble sleeping, rash and breathing problems.

"This evidence suggests that exposure to this certain class of chemical may be linked to elevated risk of health problems," said Beatrice Golomb, M.D., Ph.D., associate professor of medicine at the UC San Diego School of Medicine, whose study will be published in the early online edition of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) the week of March 10.

"Health issues among Gulf War veterans have been a concern for nearly two decades. Now, enough studies have been conducted, and results shared, to be able to say with considerable confidence that there is a link between chemical exposure and chronic, multi-symptom health problems," said Golomb. "Furthermore, the same chemicals affecting Gulf War veterans may be involved in similar cases of unexplained, multi-symptom health problems in the general population."

The study synthesized evidence regarding a class of chemicals known as acetylcholinesterase inhibitors (AChEis) and organophosphates (OP), which includes nerve gas chemicals. Some military personnel were exposed to nerve gas (sarin) when demolishing Iraqi munitions. Also, the pesticides used aggressively in Gulf regions to control sand flies and other insects fall in the same category of chemicals. This includes the carbamate pyridostigmine bromide (PB) pills originally given to service members to protect against potential nerve-agent exposure. (Note: As a result of an earlier RAND corporation report by Golomb outlining the risks of using such pills, military policy has been changed.)

The study linked exposure to each of these chemicals with the chronic, multi symptom health problems in 25 to 33 percent of returning Gulf War veterans.

"There is evidence that genetics have something to do with how a body handles exposure to these chemicals," said Golomb. "Some people are genetically less able to withstand these toxins and evidence shows that these individuals have higher chance of suffering the effects of exposure." Specifically, illness is linked to lower activity of enzymes that detoxify AChEis, due to genetic variants The enzymes known to be involved are paraoxonase (PON) for OPs, including sarin, and butyrylcholinesterase (BChE) for PB.

Among those service members given PB pills as a preventive measure, those with the mutations that reduced their ability to detoxify the pills were at significantly higher risk of illness, according to Golomb.

Previous studies have shown genetic variants of these enzymes are also associated with increased rates of some neurological diseases, such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) or Lou Gehrig's disease. Golomb says this may explain the elevated levels of ALS seen in Gulf War veterans.

Some of the chemicals linked to these multi-symptom illnesses continue to be used in agriculture, and at homes and offices for pest control in the United States and around the globe. Studies not related to the Gulf War showed that agricultural workers exposed to organophosphate pesticides had 10 times the number of health symptoms as those not exposed.

"Again, genetic variants that hamper defense against these chemicals were linked to higher risk of health problems. These findings carry important implications for current members of the armed forces as well as the general public, suggesting that exposure to these pesticides in any setting may increase risk for impaired neuropsychological function and poor health" said Golomb.

University of California, San Diego Health Sciences
200 West Arbor Dr.
San Diego, CA 92103
United States
http://www.ucsd.edu

SOURCE

The State of Israel

The State of Israel

The history of Israel from the beginning to 2006. Very Interesting read.